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Abstract
Protracted conflict is one of the largest human challenges that have persistently
undermined economic and social progress. In recent years, there has been increased
emphasis on using statistical and physical science models to better understand both the
universal patterns and the underlying mechanics of conflict. Whilst macroscopic
power-law fractal patterns have been shown for death-toll in wars and self-excitation
models have been shown for roadside ambush attacks, very few works deal with the
challenge of complex dynamics between gangs at the intra-city scale. Here, based on
contributions to the historical memory of the conflict in Colombia, Medellin’s
gang-confrontation-network is presented. It is shown that socio-economic and violence
indexes are moderate to highly correlated to the structure of the network. Specifically,
the death-toll of conflict is strongly influenced by the leading eigenvalues of the gangs’
conflict adjacency matrix, which serves a proxy for unstable self-excitation from revenge
attacks. The distribution of links based on the geographic distance between gangs in
confrontation leads to the confirmation that territorial control is a main catalyst of
violence and retaliation among gangs. Additionally, the Boltzmann-Lotka-Volterra
(BLV) dynamic interaction network analysis is applied to quantify the spatial
embeddedness of the dynamic relationship between conflicting gangs in Medellin, results
suggest that more involved and comprehensive models are needed to described the
dynamics of Medellin’s armed conflict.
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Introduction
Conflict, in one guise or another, has plagued human progress since historical records
began. Protracted conflict is a critical force in stopping societal development and
meeting the Millennium Goals. The ability to understand and predict conflict can
inform peacekeeping and lead to long-term prosperity [1]. Since the Cold War, conflict
has increasingly become subversive, trans-national, trans-genre, and difficult to both
define and arrest. Armed violence is often intermixed with illegal smuggling, narcotics,
financial crimes and criss-cross several nations. The Colombian conflict is an interesting
case of protracted conflict, both due to its complexity in the changing relationship
between the governments, paramilitary groups, crime syndicates, and guerrillas; as well
as the international attention from the illegal drug trade. The case of Medellin is of
particular interest because it is a city that has been suffering the presence of gangs since
the 1960s with the rise of the infamous Medellin Cartel. Funding from drug trafficking
transformed traditional gang dynamics into violent proxy territorial battles for the
cartels. Simultaneously, guerrilla groups, mainly FARC, ELN and EPL, established
cooperation pacts with the gangs, increasing their influence and ability to recruit. In
the late 90’s and early 00’s the presence of paramilitary groups in the socio-political
context of Colombia also allowed those groups to co-opt the gangs in Medellin [2]. After
the 2003-2005 demobilization agreement between the paramilitary army and the
Colombian government, gangs come back again to the service of the narco-cartels and
co-opt local legal economies.
The qualitative arguments on territorial conflict at the intra-city scale have been
well understood over the decades through extensive ground-level studies by the Instituto
de Estudios Politicos– UdeA, Instituto Popular de Cultura, Centro de Analisis Politico –
Universidad EAFIT and recently the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histoo´rica (CNMH).
However, there lacks a unified quantitative model which can both describe the chain of
historical conflict events, as well as potentially forecast future conflict dynamics.
Literature Review
Conflict prediction can generally be divided between data-driven statistical methods
and causal reasoning [1]. In data-driven methods, statistical trends (e.g. cycles,
power-laws [3], spatial-temporal processes [4]) are used to guide prediction. Recently,
the availability of high spatial resolution data allowed researchers to have significant
impact in the field [5,6] and show that the statistical patterns are significant [7–10], and
can have self-excitation behaviour (i.e., Hawkes process) [11]. However, the accuracy of
such models is either confined to the aggregate scale or fine-tuned to work in a highly
specific context. Furthermore, the low-dimensional model parameters often do not
naturally reflect the multi-dimensional causal factors. On the other hand, causal
reasoning is used to combine domain expertise and real-time knowledge to predict
violence. Groups of experts have been shown to be effective in reducing bias and
surveys of experts to quantify risk predicts general trends well.
Alternative Agent-Based Model (ABM) approaches are on the other hand able to
test hypotheses and causal mechanisms such as policy interventions. Many attempts
have been made to create mechanisms that explain conflict using interacting agents,
including: clash of cultures [12], distribution of political responsibility, technology
transfer [13], foreign aid fluctuations, and deterioration of the natural environment.
However, their complexity and data dependency means that a universal ABM is absent.
Scalable ground census using natural language processing also works well when a
curated target-specific learning [17]. However, such approaches do not integrate the
growing data collection (e.g. ACLED, UCDP, GTD) and data science capabilities.
Recently, moving beyond logistic regression, higher dimensional machine learning
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approaches that combine multiple causal factors and big data have been used to predict
violence. Techniques such as Random Forest are able to indicate the relative importance
of different factors but lack the mechanical insight to indicate why [18]. Furthermore,
over-fitting and catastrophic forgetting are critical issues which will prevent the method
from predicting unexpected new events. Indeed, even advanced deep learning techniques
are likely to predict self-regressive behaviour (e.g., protracted war), but not new
events [1].
The third modelling category belongs to interaction dynamics, which attempt to
model the key relationship dynamics between actors. As interactions underpins the
fabric of human society across multiple population scales, methods such as the
entropy-maximising Boltzmann-Lotka-Volterra (BLV) spatial interaction model can
describe the projected flow of threat or influence between adjacent population
groups [14]. Such models have been used to model ancient conflicts [15] and predict the
likelihood of new ones [16].
The Boltzmann-Lotka-Volterra (BLV) model feeds from, e.g., the gravity-based
principle [19,20] in the social sciences that provided a formal strategy to assets the
effect geographic distance on connectivity of spatial networks dynamics and human
behaviour [19–23,27]. The idea that the likelihood of a relationship (e.g., social or
economic) is inversely proportional to the physical distance between two entities
(Refs. [19, 20]). In economic geography, the gravity model was used to explain migration
flows between countries, regions, or cities [22], and showed that movement of people
between cities is proportional to the product of their population size and inversely
proportional to the square of the distance between them. In the context of international
economics, the gravity model of trade predicts trade- flow volumes and capital flows
between two units to be directly proportional to the economic sizes of the units (using
GDP data) and inversely proportional to the distance between them [21].
In the context of corporate competition, spatial network analysis was utilized to
show [27] that the spatial locations of firms are positively correlated with the
population density, and that firm competition networks are governed by cumulative
advantage rules and geographic distance (which is equivalent to the BLV). In the
contexts of civil unrest and riots [23,24], it has been shown, both theoretically and
empirically that social unrest dynamics is based on the hypothesis that widespread
unrest arises from internal processes of positive feedback and cascading effects in the
form of contagion and social diffusion over spatially interdependent regions connected
through social and mass communication networks. So that social instability can be
considered as a spatial epidemics phenomenon, similar to other spatially extended
dynamical systems in the physical and biological sciences, such as earthquakes, forest
fires, and epidemics. This perspective was confirmed by modelling the 2005 French riots
using spatial epidemiological models [24]. Here we extend these ideas to the case of
urban paramilitary groups in their hegemonization process in Medellin, Colombia.
Contribution
The gang confrontation network, over twenty-years of intense conflict, of Medellin is
presented. It is shown that the violence escalation is highly correlated with
socio-economical indexes like the Gini Coefficient, Human Right Violations, Homicide
Rate and Unemployment Rate. A high correlation between the structure of the gang
confrontation network and the escalation of conflict in Medellin is presented. The
collected data was analysed under the light of network theory and models from complex
systems were employed to simulate the structure of the network. Specifically,
application of the Boltzmann-Lotka-Vollterra model confirmed that the conflict network
of gangs in Medellin is spatial and therefore in strongly driven by territory control.
Results suggest that more involved and comprehensive models are needed to described
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the dynamics of Medellin’s armed conflict.
This document is organized into four sections. The Introduction reviews the context
of the gangs in Medellin and the mathematical models implemented previously in a
similar context. Materials and Methods Section discusses the data sources and presents
the dynamic analysis of networks and the BLV formalism. Results and Discussion
Section covers the main results obtained from the gang’s conflict network, the relation
between socio-economic and network properties with the escalation of violence and the
simulations obtained after the implementation of BLV methodology. Finally, in
Conclusions Section, the results are summarized.
Materials and Methods
Data Sources
After the demobilization of paramilitary groups, Colombia government created the
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica–CNMH (National Center for Historical Memory)
to collect and process the contributions from demobilized people to the historical
memory of the conflict. The CNMH reconstructed the memory of Medellin conflict in
the Law 1424 Historical Memory Report on the Bloque Metro, Bloque Cacique
Nutibara and Bloque Heroes de Granda that are paramilitary structures that operated
in Medellin. In the framework of that report, information on the ego of gangs and their
relationships were identified and processed for six well defined periods of time: (i)
previous to the incursion of the Bloque Metro, ca. 1995-2000; (ii) during the presence of
the Bloque Metro, ca. 2000-2002; (iii) during the war of the Bloque Metro and the
Bloque Cacique Nutibara that annihilated the Bloque Metro, ca. 2002; (iv) during the
presence of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara that demobilized in 2003, ca. 2003 (v) during
the presence of the Bloque Heroes de Granada, ca. 2003-2008 that demobilized in 2005
and (vi) during the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) to civil life
period, ca. 2008-2014.
Specifically, the ego of the gang comprises information on the participation in
paramilitary groups, the illegal economies they controlled, the area of influence and an
approximated number of members. Due to the confidential character of the information,
gangs were labeled with a unique code with no more information than a label for the
administrative zone of the city where they operated and a random number, e.g., CE026
denotes a gang in the Center-Eastern zone (CE) and 026 is a random number associated
to that gang in that zone. As expected, gangs come from and operate in the most
conflicted zones of Medellin’s, namely, Center-Eastern (CE), North-Eastern (NE),
Center-Western (CW) and North-Western (NW) zones. The information on the type of
(i) confrontation, (ii) collaboration among gangs, (iii) godfathership, (iv) subservience
and (v) types of confrontation and collaboration between gangs and State Agencies were
registered for completeness. The data set was complemented with information from
local media. For the present analysis, in the framework of the Cooperation Agreement
between CNMH and Universidad de Antioquia (UdeA), only the dataset associated to
confrontations is utilized.
Medellin’s armed-conflict-nature suggested the formulation of three main categories:
(1) direct conflict between two gangs acting by themselves, (2) conflict between a gang
pertaining to a paramilitary or guerrilla group and a gang acting by itself and (3)
conflict between gangs pertaining to different paramilitary or guerrilla groups. The
reasons for igniting a particular confrontation were registered as: (A) Interpersonal, (B)
Territory defense and control, (C) Control of micro economies, (D) Control of macro
economies, (E) Loyalty to a macro structure, (F) Counterinsurgency, (G) Self-defense
and/or (H) Drug trafficking. For instance, the confrontation between CE026 and CN032
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may be characterized, e.g., as 1A, 1B. From the information collected, five directed and
weighted networks were constructed with the nodes being the gangs and State Agencies.
For the confrontation network, edges start in the node that ignites the confrontation
and end at the nodes upon which the action rests. The weight of the edges corresponds
to the number of confrontation codes needed to characterized the type of confrontation
between two gangs. In the example above, if CE026 ignited the confrontation against
CN032 and the confrontation was characterized as 1A, 1B (two confrontation codes);
then, the edge starts in CE026, ends in CN032 and has weight 2. The networks for each
period were constructed, as previously done, e.g., in Ref. [27], using the “snowball
sampling” [33].
The CNMH-UdeA collaboration identified 671 gangs in the city across the six
periods. During the observation periods, some gangs were annihilated and new gangs
were created so that nodes may change from period to period. Of the total of gangs
identified in the city, information was found only for 317 of them. The reasons for the
lack of information, in particular, for the last two periods was the apprehensiveness of
the demobilized people to contribute with information on illegal activities once they
were officially reintegrated into the legal-civil society. Moreover, due to the intricate
nature of the conflict, it was not always possible to infer the direction of the edges; in
these cases, undirected links were utilized. The data was independently collected and
processed by seven social scientists from ca. 70% of the officially demobilized people
that operated in Medellin and under the supervision of the lead team of CNMH and
UdeA. The data was then shared and confronted by all the members of the collaboration
to agree, e.g., on the number of confrontation codes needed to characterize each
confrontation and to deliver a first unified version of the network. A comprehensive
quantitative analysis of the networks and gangs information is in progress.
Data availability: The information about the number of violence acts are taken
from the Observatorio Nacional de Memoria y Conflicto of CNMH and accounts for
information on infringements of International Humanitarian Law, namely, war actions,
selective assassination, terrorist attack, damage to civilian property, enforced
disappearance, massacre, recruitment, kidnapping, sexual violence. The Gini coefficient,
Unemployment and Homicide Rates were compiled by the authors from open data
provided by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica of Colombia
(DANE). The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are attached
as supporting information.
Spectral Analysis: A Dynamic Analysis Motivation
The presence of paramilitary structures in Medellin can be conceived as a dynamical
network with the main distinctive stages depicted by the six periods described above.
However, the annihilation and emergence of dominant structures of very different
character, namely, anti-insurgent (Bloque Metro), narco-paramilitary (Bloque Cacique
Nutibara) and political-paramilitary (Bloque Heroes de Granada) suggest a separate
analysis to uncover similarities and differences in their modus operandi. Thus, instead of
directly addressing the dynamics of the network across every stage, the global properties
of each network are characterised below by means of a spectral analysis of the
confrontation adjacency matrix.
The eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix can be clearly related to the dynamics of
the conflict. In doing so, define a state vector P with components {pi}. The linearised
dynamics satisfy p˙i(t) = −pi(t) +
∑
j aijpj(t), where A = aij is the adjacency matrix.
aij contains the information about existence of confrontation among the i
th and jth
nodes (gangs) whereas pk quantifies the intensity of the violence exerted or suffered by
the kth node. In matrix notation, P˙ (t) = −P (t) + P (t)A>. To decouple this set of
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equations, note that it can be written as [34]
x˙(t) = −x(t) + λx(t), (1)
where x = P e and λ and e being the eigenvalues and eigenvectors matrix of A>,
respectively. Since networks considered here are undirected, i.e., A is symmetric and
real, then its eigenvalues are real. Therefore, the system described by the differential
equation (1) reaches a stable regime only for λ < 1; for other values of λ, solutions
diverge in the long-time regime. Moreover, the Perron-Frobenius theorem [35]
guarantees that A will have a unique positive leading eigenvalue λL and the dynamics of
the system will be mainly governed by this dominant eigenvalue of A. The second
largest eigenvalue λL2 can be interpreted as a second order correction in the stability
analysis rate of convergence to equilibrium distribution.
The war rules of each period are assumed to be encoded in the adjacency matrix.
Thus, the assumption here is that during each period the characteristics of the
linearised dynamics are governed by the adjacency matrix. This assumption, not
verified here due to the lack of information for every period, is then utilized to compare
the global properties between all stages of Medellin’s conflict.
Boltzmann-Lotka-Volterra Models for Conflict Networks
Boltzmann-Lotka-Volterra (BLV) models have been widely used to model spatial
networks [14,31,36,37]. This approach applies when the external dynamics that may
trigger conflicts (i.e., climate change and drought) are quasi-static over the time period
of a few decades [32]. The main goal of the BLV formalism is to merge two well-known
models in science: the maximisation of entropy proposed by Boltzmann and a
competition model also known as predator-prey model proposed by Lotka and Volterra.
The target of this formalism is to predict the values of the ties among the nodes that
constitute the network, i.e., to generate the adjacency matrix. The values of aij
predicted by the theory will be bounded between 0 and 1, thus generating a weighted
network that should maximise the entropy functional S = −∑ij aij log aij with∑
ij aijdij = C and
∑
ij(aij log pi + aij log pj) = B. Here, dij is the distance between
the nodes i and j and pi is the benefit associated to the i
th-node, C and B are
constants that can be understood as the total spatial cost and the total benefit,
respectively. Note that the BLV formalism is, therefore, a methodology to find the
optimal solution of a cost-benefit problem.
By solving the constrained optimisation problem established above, the weight of the
links between the nodes, as a generalisation of the Boltzmann probability distribution,
can be obtained from
aij =
(pipj)
αe−βdij∑
ij(pipj)
αe−βdij
, (2)
where α and β are the Lagrange multipliers required for solving the constrained
optimisation problem. A similar approach, but in the context of corporate competition,
was performed in Ref. [27] by Braha et al. They proposed a model combining
preferential attachment and geographic distance effects, where the probability of
competition between firms will be proportional to (kikj)
γdδij . The key idea behind is
that: “The physical distance between nodes in geographic networks plays an important
role in determining the costs and benefits of communication and transport [27]” which
have significant importance in the context of gang war and company competition.
With no loss of generality, α is set to 1 in Eq. (2) and the degree-preference model is
assumed, i.e., pi → ki, where ki is the degree of the ith-node of the network obtained
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from the data. Hence, the links can be written as
aij =
(kikj)e
−βdij∑
ij(kikj)e
−βdij . (3)
The goal is to obtain the optimal value of β in Eq. (3) that best fits the confrontation
network reconstructed from the collected data. The predicted network is generated as
follows: (i) the weighted edges are generated according to Eq. (3); (ii) only the Ned
biggest values are selected– Ned is the number of edges in the real network–; and (iii)
the weights are set to 1 and the rest of them equal to 0. This was done to assure that
both, the real and generated adjacency matrices, have the same number of links and are
binary matrices.
The accuracy of the adjacency matrix obtained from the model is measured by the
distance, in the space of matrix, to the the adjacency matrix reconstructed from the
collected data. The distance can be calculated, e.g., by means of the Frobenius distance
DF =
√
tr(Ar −Am)(Ar −Am)T, multiplying distance DM = 1−N−1
∑
ij A
r
ijA
m
ij or
the subtraction distance DS = N
−1∑
ij |Arij −Amij |. Ar is the adjacency matrix
reconstructed from demobilized people contributions and Am the adjacency matrix
obtained from the model. Finding the value of β in Eq. (3) that minimises the matrix
distance allows for reconstructing the conflict interaction network using the BLV
methodology.
Results and Discussion
General Description of the Confrontation Network
The distribution of gangs in the city is sociologically understood in terms of the late
colonisation of the city, mainly, by victims of forced displacement from the countryside
of Antioquia department. To quantitatively justify the distribution of gangs in the city,
it has been commonly assumed that the distribution and density of gangs obey
geo-economics criteria. To test this hypothesis, Fig. 1 presents the number of gangs as a
function of (i) the Estrato1 of the neighboorhood, (ii) the area of the neighboorhood
and (iii) the housing density per hectare. The main presence of gangs in the lowest
Estratos can be socio-economically understood. However, the dependence on the area of
the neighboorhood and the housing density per hectare suggests that there is no trivial
explanation for the presence of gangs in different zones of the city. For the case of
corporate competition, in Ref. [27], it was demonstrated that the spatial locations of
firms are positively correlated with population density. Although this result is intuitively
clear, it cannot be generalized straightforwardly to the case of gangs in Medellin
because of its topography: a small valley that accommodates people homogeneously so
that different the zones of the cities are fairly equally populated. Therefore, to fully
understand the gang phenomenon in Medellin from a geographic perspective, a further
socio-demography analysis is needed and will be conducted elsewhere.
Tolopogy of Confrontation Network
Since it was not possible to clearly identify the area of operation of all gangs, below, two
datasets are considered: (i) The weighted full network that contains information of 317
gangs For this case, the 1995-2000 network comprises 186 nodes and 277 links, in
1Cities in Colombia are divided into Estratos from one to six. Citizens who live in the lowest Estratos–
one, two and three– have reduced-fares for public services (water, gas, electricity). Citizens who live in
the highest Estratos– five and six– covers the reduction for the lowest Estratos. Estrato four corresponds
to middle class, citizens who pay what they consume.
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Fig 1. Left panel: Number of gangs per Estrato. Central panel: Comparison between
the number of gangs and the size area per neighboorhood. Right panel: Comparison
between the number of gangs and the density of housing per neighboorhood
shorthand notation (186:277), the 2000-2002 network comprises (127:148) whereas the
2002 network (91:122) and the 2003, 2003-2008 and 2008-2014 networks have (83:131),
(40:48) and (80:119), respectively. (ii) The unweighted geo-referenced network comprises
the gangs for which it was possible to collect georeferencing information; additionally,
this network considers no difference between having one or several reasons to get into
conflict. The topology analysis is performed only for the full network whereas the
subsequent analysis is comparatively presented, when possible, for both networks.
Information needed to reproduce the results presented here is provided in the
Supplementary Information.
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Fig 2. The log-log plots of the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
(CCDF) of nodes centralities. The left hand side panel corresponds to the degree
centrality measure whereas the right hand side panel corresponds to the eigenvector
centrality measure.
For the six periods introduced above and under the assumption that the full network
is undirected, Fig. 2 depicts the cumulative probability function for two different
centrality measures, namely, degree and eigenvector centralities. The Complementary
Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) for the six periods was fitted to five known
distribution functions, namely, stretched exponential, exponential, power, power with
cutoff and LogNormal functions. Results are displayed in Table 1. Based on the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), it is concluded that the CCDF can be accurately
described by an exponential model e−λcx. Table 2 presents the relevant parameter
information for the fit.
As in Ref. [27], the robustness of the confrontation network is analysed below in
terms of the size of the largest of the network after (i) removing randomly nodes of the
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BIC for Degree Centrality Distributions Models
Network
Stretched Exp. Exp. Power Power Cutoff LogNormal
kcx
βc−1e−λcx
βc
kce
−λcx kcx−γc kcx−γce−λcx kcx−1e−
(ln x−µ)2
2σ2
1995-2000 -576.259 -581.441 4729.93 -579.259 341.53
2000-2002 -276.601 -281.462 210.807 -277.87 231.971
2002 -293.043 -297.582 153.215 -293.789 169.178
2003 -238.784 -243.113 138.868 -239.101 157.503
2003-2008 -77.3534 -81.0855 72.8323 -77.4182 77.4182
2008-2014 -180.69 -185.081 136.377 -181.201 151.169
BIC for Eigenvector Centrality Distributions Models
Network Stretched Exp. Exp. Power Power Cutoff LogNormal
1995-2000 -768.546 -763.403 4776.1 -770.574 364.752
2000-2002 -602.729 -606.312 3288.79 -602.956 233.429
2002 -290.716 -257.489 98.2406 -293.994 176.977
2003 -298.711 -301.261 82.0277 -299.546 159.457
2003-2008 -39.6239 -40.7717 39.4389 -40.4037 83.023
2008-2014 -298.088 -292.277 71.6443 -299.771 149.643
Table 1. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for various fitting models of the
Centrality CCFCs. kc is calculate from
∫∞
xmin
dxkcf(x) = 1 with xmin the the lower
bound of the range of possible values that the random variable can attain. BIC is
defined as k lnn− 2 lnL with k being the number of parameters estimated by the
model, n number of data points in x, x the observed data and L the maximised value of
the likelihood function of the model. The Model with the lowest BIC is preferred.
Network
Degree Centrality Eigenvector Centrality
λc λc
EstValue StError EstValue StError
1995-2000 0.315704 0.00399511 365.557 3.38807
2000-2002 0.39655 0.00914728 136.155 0.967632
2002 0.365193 0.00616567 105.908 2.65042
2003 0.2711 0.00548173 73.0748 1.06943
2003-2008 0.300517 0.0127068 29.7294 1.95771
2008-2014 0.401977 0.0108252 82.2071 1.18253
Table 2. Fitting parameters of the CCDF in Fig. 2 to the exponential function e−λcx.
network or (ii) removing the nodes in order of decreasing degree centrality. A network is
consider fragile if after excising a single node it falls apart into many small pieces. The
global behaviour observed in Fig. 3 is that networks are resilient against removing
random nodes, but weak against the targeted deletion of high–degree nodes. Thus, the
confrontation network of gangs in Medellin is fragile against removing highly connected
nodes.
Socio-economic Context of Medellin’s Gang Confrontation
Network
In terms of violence activity, there are two recent significant peaks in Medellin: one in
2002 and the other in 2010, which split the history into three significant periods. The
first period (1995-2002) is related to the incursion of the paramilitary army in the city
that lead to an upsurge in violence among the left- and right-handed gangs. This period
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Fig 3. Robustness of the confrontation network, as demonstrated by the deletion of
nodes. Red open circles (upper) shows the size of the largest strong component
surviving as nodes are randomly deleted; Blue open circles (lower) shows the size of the
largest component as nodes are deleted in order of decreasing degree centrality.
ended with the peace process of the Colombian government with the paramilitary
groups, a process that concluded with the demobilisation of 31.671 people in the whole
country and corresponded to a significant reduction of Human Rights Violations until
2008. Between 2009-2010 other illegal armed groups such as El Clan del Golfo and La
Oficina vied to take control over the illicit business in the city which led to the second
wave of recrudescence of violence.
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Fig 4. BLUE: Time series of the number of Human Rights Violations (HR Violations)
in Medellin during the years 1995-2015. RED: (left panel) Gini Coefficient for Medellin
and (right panel) Unemployment Rate in Medellin between 1995-2015.
Figure 4 depicts the time series of the numbers of violations of Human Rights in
Medellin with two significant socio-economic factors: the Unemployment Rate2 (left
panel) and the Gini Coefficient (right panel)3. Linear, measured by the r-Pearson
2The Unemployment Rate is based on the reports of the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Estadistica of Colombia (DANE)’s. For 1995 to 2000, the annual Unemployment Rate was calculated
as the arithmetic average of the quarterly reported unemployment rate. For 2001 to 2015, the annual
annual Unemployment Rate was literally extracted from DANE’s reports.
3The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica of Colombia (DANE) started reporting
the Gini coefficient only in 2002. In 2005, it changed its methodology and did no report data for 2006
and 2007. The Gini coefficient time-series was completed as follows: data for 2001, 2006 and 2007
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coefficient, as well as non-linear, measured by the ρ-Spearman coefficient, correlations
are displayed in each panel. Figure 4 shows that the Unemployment Rate (UR) and the
Gini Coefficient are highly correlated, with the number of Human Rights Violations
(HR Violations).
Since not all Human Rights Violations can be exclusively associated to the gang
conflict, the context analysis is complemented with the Homicide Rate per 100,000
inhabitants, the category that is mainly associated to the gang conflict. These four
variables comprises a fully-connected and strongly correlated network (see below), thus
confirming the correlation between violence and socio-economic factors. Focus here is on
finding how the structure of the conflict network affects the behaviour of the gangs and
violence indexes in Medellin. Specifically, how the number of gangs Ng, the leading λL
and second leading λL2 eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix correlate with the
socio-economic and violence indexes.
Figure 5 presents the network of linear (top panel) and non-linear (bottom panel)
correlations of the confrontation network parameters with the number of Human Rights
Violations (HR Violations), Homicide Rate (HR) per 100,000 inhabitants,
Unemployment Rate and the Gini Coefficient. Figure 5 shows that non-linear
correlations are stronger than linear ones. Specifically, note that the non-linear
correlation network remains fully connected for p ≤ 0.05 whereas for that value of p, Ng
is left as an isolated node in the linear correlation network. However, the fact that each
network presents correlations between different variables suggests that the correlation
analysis should consider both type of correlations complementarily rather than
independently. Thus, Fig. 5 shows that the leading eigenvalue λL of the confrontation
network linearly correlates with the Gini Coefficient and is non-linearly correlated with
the Homicide Rate, the second leading λL2 linearly correlates with the number of
Human Right Violations whereas Ng has a weak linear correlation but a strong
non-linear correlation with the Homicide Rate and the Gini Coefficient.
The correlation between the number of gangs and the Homicide Rate directly follows
from the armed-domination strategy of paramilitary groups in the city: gangs in
opposition and not subordinated to the hegemonic paramilitary structures were
annihilated or decimated; thus, increasing the number of homicides in the city. In the
framework of the Frobenius-Perron theorem, λL is interpreted as the rate at which the
number of confrontations increases or decreases and therefore of the number of
homicides; this explains the correlation between λL and the Homicide Rate. On an
abstract ground, gangs that are highly connected to other highly connected gangs will
incur in a higher probability of cascade violence. The second leading eigenvalue λL2 can
be interpreted as the rate of convergence to equilibrium distribution and it is associated
to the mixing time of the network; this explains why it correlates with HR Violations,
which not only incorporates assassination of gang members. Figure 5 thus allows to
conclude that the structure of the confrontation network, the socio-economic variables
and violence indexes in the city are certainly correlated.
BLV Model for the Confrontation Network
Figure 6 depicts the geographic location of gangs in the city by red dots and the
hostility ties by blue lines between them. The network is highly space-correlated, i.e.,
the ties among the nodes are mainly between nearby nodes instead of distant nodes.
This is also supported by the distribution of links based on the geographic distance
between nodes presented in Fig. 7. Therefore, the geolocalization of gangs is a
significantly important factor to deeply understand their behaviour in the network. This
was calculated by using a linear regressor from the reported data (see, SI for details) and the data
from 1995 to 2000 was obtained from reports of the World Bank for Colombia, which was additionally
supplemented by a linear interpolation to get an approximate coefficient for 1996,1997 and 1998.
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Pearson correlation network for r ≥ 0.6 and p ≤ 0.07
Spearman correlation network for ρ ≥ 0.6 and p ≤ 0.07
Fig 5. Linear and non-linear correlation networks of the number of Human Rights
Violations (HR Violations), Homicide Rate (HR) per 100,000 inhabitants,
Unemployment Rate, Gini Coefficient, Number of gangs Ng and the leading λL and
second leading λL2 eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. For the same correlation
network, left panels presents the r, ρ-values and right panels do for p-values. Only
correlations satisfying r, ρ ≥ 0.6 and p ≤ 0.07 were considered.
is particularly significant since it points to the fact that the conflict relations of gangs in
Medellin are in great proportion related to territory control, confirming the hypothesis
previously proposed by other authors [2, 39–42].
Therefore, the geolocalisation of gangs is a significantly important factor to deeply
understand their behaviour in the network and motivates the usage of spatial network
models [44]. Specifically, the cost-benefit behaviour of gangs suggests that the BLV
formalism can be a sensible approach to model Medellin’s gang phenomenon. Since the
number of nodes decreases for the geo-referenced network and the graph is considered
unweighted (see above), then it is instrumental to recalculate the correlation network,
results are presented in Fig. 8 for linear (l.h.s panel) and non-linear (r.h.s panel)
correlation measures.
In contrast to Figs. 5, Figs. 8 show that the context variables (HR Violations,
Homicide Rate, Unemployment Rate and Gini Coefficient) and confrontation network
properties (Ng, λL and λL2) aggregate in well defined fully-connected-closed-networks.
For linear correlations, “interaction” between closed networks is provided by the
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1995-2000 2000-2002 2002
2003 2003-2008 2008-2014
Fig 6. Gang confrontation network in Medellin. The localization of the gangs is
presented as a red dot in the map of Medellin and the enmity ties are represented by
blue lines. The background map was built using Mapbox.
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Fig 7. Distribution of links based on the geographic distance between nodes.
correlation between λL and λL2 with the Homicide Rate and Gini Coefficient,
respectively. For non-linear correlations, “interaction” between closed networks is
provided by the additional correlation between λL2 and Homicide Rate. Despite the
differences between the full and the geo-referenced confrontation-networks, and
therefore of the particular correlations between variables, the strong non-linear
correlation between λL and the Homicide Rate is common to both
confrontation-networks. This is a robust and key finding of the present work.
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Pearson (l.h.s) and Spearman (r.h.s) correlation network for r, ρ ≥ 0.6 and p ≤ 0.07
Fig 8. Linear and non-linear correlation networks of the number of Human Rights
Violations (HR Violations), Homicide Rate (HR) per 100,000 inhabitants,
Unemployment Rate, Gini Coefficient, Number of gangs Ng and the leading λL and
second leading λL2 eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. Edges’ thickness is proportional
to r, ρ coefficients (the thickest edge corresponds to the r = 0.943 correlation between
the Gini Coefficient and Ng whereas the thinest edge corresponds to r = 0.625
correlation between the Gini Coefficient and the Unemployment Rate. Only correlations
satisfying r, ρ ≥ 0.6 and p ≤ 0.07 were considered.
BLV-Predicted Adjacency Confrontation Matrix
For each period of time, the values of the three distance measures defined above are
shown in Fig. 9. The Multiplying distance DM is bounded: 0 ≤ DM ≤ 1 ranging
between identical matrices to matrices having orthogonal support, respectively. Since
adjacency matrices considered here are not normalized, then it is not straightforward to
assign a particular interpretation to a given value of the distance measures. However,
note that the behavior of the three measures, as a function of β, is identical. Therefore,
despite that high spatial character of the confrontation network in Figs. 7 and 6, Fig. 9
shows that the BLV method does not accurately described the reconstructed adjacency
matrix since DM ∼ 0.5. This can be a consequence of the small dataset in the present
version of the reconstructed network or an indication that the BLV may not applied at
the inter-city scale. Different alternatives to quantitatively predict the spatial
embedding of the conflict are currently under study.
Conclusions
The analysis presented in Fig 3 allows concluding that the conflict networks are resilient
against removing random nodes, but weak against the targeted deletion of high–degree
nodes. Figures. 5 and 8 clearly show that the socio-economic variables utilized here and
the confrontation network properties are moderate to highly correlated to the escalation
of conflict in Medellin during the last twenty years. Particularly, the correlation among
the leading eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix λL and the Homicide Rate allows to
conclude that the topological structure of the network is a significant descriptor of the
violence in the city. Since the leading eigenvalue is always higher than two, based on the
Frobenuios-Perron theorem, it can be concluded that the conflict network does not
reach stability. This can be interpreted as a measurement of the instability of the
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Fig 9. Matrix distance DF, DM and DS as a function of β parameter. For each period
of time, optimal the value corresponds to β = {0.6, 1.1, 0.7, 0.6, 1.0, 0.5}. A high value of
β represents a short distance interaction and conversely, a low value implies long-range
interaction.
conflict network, leading to retaliation among gangs and hence manifested as an
occurrence on the number of Human Rights Violations in the city and vice-versa.
Figures 7 and 6 suggest that the conflict network of gangs in Medellin is spatial.
However, the BLV formalism do not accurately describe the reconstructed confrontation
network and different alternatives to quantitatively predict the spatial embedding of the
conflict are currently under study. To summarize, a high correlation between the
structure of a gang confrontation network and the escalation of conflict in Medellin was
presented and that the territory control mechanism is a main driven force of the conflict
among the gangs in Medellin.
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